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Abstract. Groth-Sahai proofs are efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that have found widespread use in pairing-
based cryptography. We propose efficiency improvements of Groth-Sahai proofs in the SXDH setting, which is the one that
yields the most efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.
– We replace some of the commitments with ElGamal encryptions, which reduces the prover’s computation and for some
types of equations reduces the proof size.
– Groth-Sahai proofs are zero-knowledge when no public elements are paired to each other. We observe that they are also
zero-knowledge when base elements for the groups are paired to public constants.
– The prover’s computation can be reduced by letting her pick her own common reference string. By giving a proof she has
picked a valid common reference string this does not compromise soundness.
– We define a type-based commit-and-prove scheme, which allows commitments to be reused in many different proofs.
Keywords: Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, commit-and-prove schemes, Groth-Sahai proofs, type-based commit-
ments.
1 Introduction
Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [BFM88] can be used to demonstrate the truth of a statement without
revealing any other information but the truth of the statement. NIZK proofs are fundamental building blocks in
cryptography and are used in numerous cryptographic schemes. It is therefore important to increase their efficiency
since even small improvements will lead to significant performance gains when aggregated over many applications.
NIZK proofs were invented more than two decades ago but early constructions [BFM88,FLS99,Dam92,KP98]
were very inefficient. This changed when Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS12] introduced pairing-based techniques
for constructing NIZK proofs. In a series of works [BW06,Gro06,BW07,GS12] pairing-friendly NIZK proofs were
developed. This line of research culminated in Groth and Sahai [GS12] that gave efficient and practical NIZK proofs
that are now widely used in pairing-based cryptography.
Groth-Sahai proofs [GS12] can be instantiated in many ways with either symmetric or asymmetric pairings and
over groups that may have either composite order or prime order. The asymmetric setting with prime order groups
yields the smallest group elements [GPS08]. We will therefore focus on improving Groth-Sahai proofs for prime
order asymmetric bilinear groups, since the better efficiency makes it the most important setting for use in practice.
Let us give some more details of what can be done with Groth-Sahai proofs. The setting they consider is a
bilinear group (p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, gˆ, hˇ), where Gˆ, Hˇ,T are prime order p groups, gˆ and hˇ are generators of Gˆ and Hˇ
respectively and e : Gˆ × Hˇ → T is a non-degenerate bilinear map. The prover wants to show that there are values
xˆi ∈ Gˆ, yˇj ∈ Hˇ, xi, yj ∈ Zp simultaneously satisfying a set of equations. Groth and Sahai formulate four types of
equations, which using additive notation for group operations and multiplicative notation for the bilinear map e can
be written as follows.
Pairing-product equation: Public constants aˆj ∈ Gˆ, bˇi ∈ Hˇ, γij ∈ Zp, tT ∈ T.∑
i
xˆi · bˇi +
∑
j
aˆj · yˇj +
∑
i
∑
j
γij xˆi · yˇj = tT.
Multi-scalar multiplication equation in Gˆ: Public constants aˆj ∈ Gˆ, bi ∈ Zp, γij ∈ Zp, tˆ ∈ Gˆ.∑
i
xˆibi +
∑
j
aˆjyj +
∑
i
∑
j
γij xˆiyj = tˆ.
Multi-scalar multiplication equation in Hˇ: Public constants aj ∈ Zp, bˇi ∈ Hˇ, γij ∈ Zp, tˇ ∈ Hˇ.∑
i
xibˇi +
∑
j
aj yˇj +
∑
i
∑
j
γijxiyˇj = tˇ.
Quadratic equation in Zp: Public constants aj ∈ Zp, bi ∈ Zp, γij ∈ Zp, t ∈ Zp.∑
i
xibi +
∑
j
ajyj +
∑
i
∑
j
γijxiyj = t.
These four types of equations express in a direct way statements arising in pairing-based cryptography. For this reason
Groth-Sahai proofs are used in numerous pairing-based protocols including group signatures [Gro07], anonymous
credentials [BCKL08,BCC+09], e-cash [FPV09], etc.
Groth-Sahai proofs are witness-indistinguishable proofs, i.e., they enable a prover to convince a verifier that a
statement is true in a way such that the verifier cannot tell which witness the prover has used. For a slightly more
restricted set of statements where all pairing-product equations have tT = 0T, Groth-Sahai proofs are actually zero-
knowledge proofs, i.e., they leak no information besides the truth of the statement.
There have been several papers that extend or improve the Groth-Sahai proof system in different directions.
[Mei09] suggested how to create perfectly extractable commitments, something which is not given by the commit-
ments used by Groth and Sahai. [CHP07,BFI+10] reduced the computational cost of the verification of the proofs
using batch techniques, at the cost of trading perfect soundness for statistical soundness. [Seo12] gave another map
for verifying proofs in the symmetric setting which reduces the computational cost of the verification of the proofs.
On the other hand, they prove that the map proposed by Groth and Sahai in the asymmetric setting is optimal.
[GSW10] proposed another assumption on which Groth-Sahai proofs can be based. [BCKL08,BCC+09] exploited
rerandomization properties of Groth-Sahai proofs, which they used in anonymous credentials. Recently, [CKLM12]
introduced a new notion of malleable proof systems, which can be built from Groth-Sahai proofs. While there has
been significant research effort devoted to pairing-based NIZK proofs, Groth-Sahai proofs still remain the most ef-
ficient NIZK proofs that are based on standard intractability assumptions and there has not been any progress in
reducing their size or the prover’s computation.
1.1 Our contributions
We focus on improving efficiency and propose several ways to fine-tune Groth-Sahai zero-knowledge proofs in the
asymmetric bilinear group setting.
– Groth-Sahai proofs use public constants and committed variables. We introduce two new types of values: public
base elements and encrypted variables. This reduces the size of proofs for statements involving these values.
– We recast Groth-Sahai proofs as a commit-and-prove scheme. This makes it possible to reuse commitments in
the proofs of different statements even when these statements depend on previous commitments and proofs.
– We show that the prover’s computation can be reduced by letting her pick her own provably correct common
reference string.
Encrypted variables. The common reference string in Groth-Sahai proofs contains a public commitment key that
the prover uses to commit to variables. The prover then proceeds to prove that the committed variables satisfy the
equations in the statement. The commitment key can be set up to be perfectly binding, in which case it is impossible
to cheat in the proof (perfect soundness). Alternatively, the commitment key can be set up to be perfectly hiding, in
which case the NIZK proof can be simulated without knowledge of the witness (perfect zero-knowledge).
In our scheme we allow the prover to encrypt variables using ElGamal encryption as an alternative to the com-
mitment scheme. ElGamal encryption requires two scalar multiplications and commitments in Groth-Sahai proofs
require four scalar multiplications so this reduces the prover’s computation. Moreover, equations that use ElGamal
ciphertexts instead of commitments have simpler proofs and we save two group elements for each of those equations.
We must be careful when using ElGamal encryption though since it will always be perfectly binding regardless
of the key. We can therefore not set up the common reference string to give us perfect zero-knowledge any more.
Instead, we rely on the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption to get computational zero-knowledge and we
place some restrictions on the types of equations where ElGamal encryptions can be used.
Base elements. Groth-Sahai proofs are zero-knowledge if all pairing-product equations have tT = 0T and no public
constants are paired with each other. Groth and Sahai gave a technique to rewrite the equations to enable zero-
knowledge proofs when tT =
∑n
i=1 tˆi · tˇi, however, this comes at a cost of O(n) group elements.
We observe that the commitment keys can be set up to allow simulation in the special case where the public
constants are the base elements gˆ or hˇ. In the context of Groth-Sahai proofs this makes zero-knowledge simulation
possible when tT = aˆ · hˇ+ gˆ · bˇ for public constants aˆ ∈ Gˆ and bˇ ∈ Hˇ. This extension of Groth-Sahai proofs comes
at no extra cost, so we save the costly rewriting of the equations to get zero-knowledge.
In addition, Groth-Sahai zero-knowledge proofs for multi-scalar multiplications equations in Gˆ or in Hˇ in which
all the field elements are constants consist of 6 group elements unless tˆ = 0ˆ or tˇ = 0ˇ, in which case the size of the
proof is reduced to 2 group elements. We observe that if tˆ = gˆ or tˇ = hˇ then we can still have zero-knowledge proofs
which consist of 2 group elements.
Using commitment keys with known discrete logarithms. In Groth-Sahai proofs, the prover uses a common
reference string shared between the prover and the verifier to create NIZK proofs. This common reference string is
created by a trusted entity and, in particular, the discrete logarithms of the commitment keys with respect to gˆ and hˇ
are unknown to both the prover and the verifier.
In this paper we show how to reduce the prover’s computation by allowing her to choose her own common
reference string, which we think of as her public key. This change reduces the cost of computing her commitments
from 4 scalar multiplications to 2 scalar multiplications and it also reduces the cost of computing proofs.
The verifier does of course need a guarantee that the prover’s public key is formed as a perfectly binding common
reference string, otherwise the proofs would not be sound any more. This can be accomplished by letting the prover
give a Groth-Sahai proof, using a common reference string the verifier does trust, for the public key being correct.
We show that the prover can communicate her public key and prove it is correct using 12 group elements in total,
which is a one-off cost as the public key can be used for many commitments and proofs.
Seeing the common reference string as the prover’s public key also gives us some flexibility in the setup. In-
stead of proving the public key correct in the common reference string model, the prover could use the multi-string
model [GO07] where the setup assumption is relaxed to assuming a majority out of n common reference strings are
honest. Alternatively, the prover could give a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge to a trusted third party that the
public key is correct and get a certificate on the public key.
Type-based commit-and-prove schemes. A commit-and-prove scheme [Kil90,CLOS02] is a natural generalization
of a zero-knowledge proof, where the prover can commit to values and prove statements about the committed values.
Commit-and-prove schemes provide extra flexibility and reduce communication; the same commitments can for
instance be used in different proofs for adaptively chosen statements about the committed values.
Groth-Sahai proofs can be used to build a non-interactive commit-and-prove scheme in a natural way. Fuchs-
bauer [Fuc11] defined a witness-indistinguishable Groth-Sahai based commit-and-prove scheme and used it in the
construction of delegatable anonymous credentials.
We will formulate our construction as a non-interactive commit-and-prove scheme because it allows for greater
flexibility. It is for instance possible to choose values to be committed to in an adaptive fashion that depends on
previous commitments or proofs, while the traditional definition of NIZK proofs would require the prover to make
an entirely new set of commitments for each statement to be proven.
Our results are natural extensions of Groth-Sahai proofs and our definition of a non-interactive commit-and-
prove scheme will resemble Fuchsbauer’s [Fuc11]. However, we are in a different situation because we have more
types of elements that we want to commit to. A group element in Gˆ may for instance be committed using the
perfectly binding/perfectly hiding commitment scheme or using ElGamal encryption. We could resolve this by using
multiple commitment schemes, i.e., define and construct a many-commitment-scheme-and-prove system. However,
the definition would quickly become unwieldy as the number of commitment schemes grows.
To give a generally applicable definition of non-interactive commit-and-prove schemes, we instead propose the
notion of type-based commitments. A type-based commitment scheme enables the prover to commit to a message m
with a publicly known type t. One example of a type could for instance be t = encGˆ meaning the value m should be
encrypted (as opposed to using the more expensive commitment operation) and it should be done in group Gˆ. Type-
based commitments resemble tag-based commitments, where a message m can be committed under an arbitrary tag
tag, but a crucial difference is that while tags can be arbitrary bit-strings, types may be restricted. More precisely, we
require that the type and message pair (t,m) belong to a message spaceMck. We consider the type as being part of
the message, so another way of looking at a type-based commitment scheme is to say a message consists of public
part t and a private part m. This increases the flexibility of the commitment scheme, we can for instance create a
type (pubGˆ, x) that publicly declares the committed value x. Since the type is public this commitment is no longer
hiding, however, as we shall see it simplifies our commit-and-prove scheme because we can now commit to both
public constants and secret variables without having to treat them differently.
Armed with type-based commitments we provide a formal definition of commit-and-prove schemes, where the
prover may commit to values and prove statements about the values. We stress that commitments and proofs can
be arbitrarily interleaved so at any given point a new value or statement may depend on previous commitments
and proofs, which makes them more flexible than standard Groth-Sahai proofs. The commit-and-prove scheme is
defined to be sound if it is impossible to prove a false statement about the committed values and it is defined to be
zero-knowledge if there exists a simulator that can simulate commitments and proofs.
Applications. To illustrate the advantages of our fine-tuned Groth-Sahai proofs we will give an example based on
the weak Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [BB04], which is widely used in pairing-based protocols. The verification
key is an element vˆ ∈ Gˆ and a signature on a message m ∈ Zp is a group element σˇ ∈ Hˇ such that
(vˆ +mgˆ) · σˇ = gˆhˇ.
Suppose the prover has commitments to vˆ and σˇ and wants to demonstrate that they satisfy the verification
equation for a (public) message m. With traditional Groth-Sahai proofs the commitments c and d to vˆ and σˇ would
be treated as part of the statement and one would carefully demonstrate the existence of openings of c and d to vˆ
and σˇ satisfying the pairing-product equation. With a commit-and-prove system, we can instead jump directly to
demonstrating that the values inside vˆ and σˇ satisfy the verification equation without having to treat the openings
of the commitments as part of the witness. This saves several group elements each time one of the commitments is
used.
Next, observe that the pairing-product equation has tT = gˆ · hˇ. A direct application of Groth-Sahai proofs would
therefore not yield a zero-knowledge proof but only give witness-indistinguishability. To get zero-knowledge we
could use the workaround suggested by Groth-Sahai, which would consist of committing to a new variable yˇ, prove
that yˇ = hˇ and simultaneously (vˆ+mgˆ) · σˇ− gˆyˇ = 0T. This work-around would increase the cost of the proof from
8 group elements to 16 group elements, so we save 8 group elements by enabling a direct proof.
Now assume the prover has created her own common reference string pk and has already sent it together with
the well-formedness proof to the verifier. The prover could now use pk to compute the zero-knowledge proof for
the equation (vˆ + mgˆ) · σˇ = gˆhˇ . By using pk, she would need to do 10 scalar multiplications in Gˆ and 6 scalar
multiplications in Hˇ to compute the proof. In contrast, if she was computing the proof using the commitment key
ck, she would need to do 12 scalar multiplications in Gˆ and 10 scalar multiplications in Hˇ. As the operations in
Hˇ are usually significantly more expensive than the operations in Gˆ, the prover is essentially saving 4 expensive
operations of the 10 that she would need to do if she used ck. Therefore, our techniques reduce the computational
cost of creating the zero-knowledge proof by roughly 40%. In addition, the computational cost of computing the
commitments to vˆ and σˇ would also be reduced by 50%.
Finally, we can obtain a saving by encrypting one of the variables instead of committing to it. If we encrypt vˆ
for instance, the ciphertext is still 2 group elements just as the commitment in a Groth-Sahai proof would be, but the
cost of the proof for the pairing-product equation is reduced from 8 group elements to 6 group elements. In total we
have reduced the cost of the proof by 63% from 16 group elements to 6 group elements.
In Sec. 8 we give two concrete examples of existing schemes using Groth-Sahai proofs where our techniques can
improve efficiency.
2 Commit-and-prove scheme definitions
Let RL be a polynomial time verifiable relation containing triples (ck, x, w). We will call ck the commitment key or
the common reference string, x the statement and w the witness. We define the key-dependent language Lck as the
set of statements x for which there exists a witness w such that (ck, x, w) ∈ RL.
We will now define a commit-and-prove scheme for a relation RL. In the commit-and-prove scheme, we may
commit to different values w1, . . . , wN and prove for different statements x that a subset of the committed values
w = (wi1 , . . . , win) constitute a witness for x ∈ Lck, i.e., (ck, x, w) ∈ RL.
We will divide each committed value into two parts wi = (ti,mi). The first part ti can be thought of as a public
part that does not need to be kept secret, while the second part mi can be thought of as a secret value that our
commit-and-prove scheme should not reveal. The first part ti will be useful later on to specify the type of value mi
is, for instance a group element or a field element, and to specify which type of commitment we should make to mi.
This is a natural and useful generalization of standard commitment schemes.
A commit-and-prove scheme CP = (Gen,Com,Prove,Verify) consists of four polynomial time algorithms.
The algorithms Gen,Prove are probabilistic and the algorithms Com,Verify are deterministic.
Gen(1k): Generates a commitment key ck. The commitment key specifies a message space Mck, a randomness
spaceRck and a commitment space Cck. Membership of either space can be decided efficiently.
Comck(t,m; r): Given a commitment key ck, a message (t,m) ∈ Mck and randomness r such that (t, r) ∈ Rck
returns a commitment c such that (t, c) ∈ Cck.
Proveck(x, (t1,m1, r1), . . . , (tn,mn, rn)): Given a commitment key ck, statement x and commitment openings
such that (ti,mi) ∈Mck, (ti, ri) ∈ Rck and (ck, x, t1,m1, . . . , tn,mn) ∈ RL returns a proof pi.
Verifyck(x, (t1, c1), . . . , (tn, cn), pi): Given a commitment key ck, a statement x, a proof pi and commitments (ti, ci) ∈
Cck returns 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
Definition 1 (Perfect correctness). The commit-and-prove system CP is (perfectly) correct if for all adversaries A
Pr
[
ck ← Gen(1k) ; (x,w1, r1, . . . , wn, rn)← A(ck) ; ci ← Comck(wi; ri) ;
pi ← Proveck(x,w1, r1, . . . , wn, rn) : Verifyck(x, (t1, c1), . . . , (tn, cn), pi) = 1
]
= 1,
where A outputs wi, ri such that wi = (ti,mi) ∈Mck, (ti, ri) ∈ Rck and (ck, x, w1, . . . , wn) ∈ RL.
We say a commit-and-prove scheme is sound if it is impossible to prove a false statement. Strengthening the
usual notion of soundness, we will associate unique values to the commitments, and these values will constitute a
witness for the statement. This means that not only does a valid proof guarantee the truth of the statement, but also
each commitment will always contribute a consistent witness towards establishing the truth of the statement.
Definition 2 (Perfect soundness). The commit-and-prove system CP is (perfectly) sound if there exists a determin-
istic (unbounded) opening algorithm Open such that for all adversaries A
Pr
[
ck ← Gen(1k) ; (x, t1, c1, . . . , tn, cn, pi)← A(ck) ; mi ← Openck(ti, ci) :
Verifyck(x, t1, c1, . . . , tn, cn, pi) = 0 ∨ (ck, x, (t1,m1), . . . , (tn,mn)) ∈ RL
]
= 1.
Extending the notion of soundness we may define knowledge as the ability to efficiently extract a witness for the
truth of the statement proven when given an extraction key xk. Actually, the commit-and-prove schemes we construct
will not allow the extraction of all types of witnesses due to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. However,
we can specify a function F such that we can extract F (ck, w) from a commitment. Efficient extraction of a witness
corresponds to the special case where F (ck, w) = m, with m being the secret part of the witness w = (t,m).
Definition 3 (Perfect F -knowledge). Let in the following ExtGen and Ext be two algorithms as described below.
– ExtGen is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on 1k returns (ck, xk). We call ck the commitment
key and xk the extraction key. We require that the probability distributions of ck made by ExtGen and Gen are
identical.
– Ext is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that given an extraction key xk and (t, c) ∈ Cck returns a value.
The commit-and-prove scheme CP with perfect soundness for opening algorithm Open has F -knowledge for a
function F if for all adversaries A
Pr
[
(ck, xk)← ExtGen(1k) ; (t, c)← A(ck, xk) :
(t, c) /∈ Cck ∨ Extxk(t, c) = F (ck, t,Open(t, c))
]
= 1.
We say a commit-and-prove scheme is zero-knowledge if it does not leak information about the secret parts of the
committed messages besides what is already leaked by the public parts. This is defined as the possibility to simulate
commitments and proofs without knowing the secret parts of the messages (the types are known) if instead some
secret simulation trapdoor is known about the commitment key ck.
Following [Gro06,GOS12] we define a strong notion of zero-knowledge called composable zero-knowledge.
Composable zero-knowledge says the commitment key can be simulated, and if the commitment key is simulated it
is not possible to distinguish real proofs from simulated proofs even if the simulation trapdoor is known.
Definition 4 (Composable zero-knowledge). The commit-and-prove system CP is (computationally) composable
zero-knowledge if there exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithms SimGen, SimCom,SimProve such that for
all non-uniform polynomial time stateful interactive adversaries A 3
Pr
[
ck ← Gen(1k) : A(ck) = 1
]
≈ Pr
[
(ck, tk)← SimGen(1k) : A(ck) = 1
]
and
Pr
[
(ck, tk)← SimGen(1k); (x, i1, . . . , in)← AComck(·)(ck, tk);
pi ← Proveck(x,wi1 , ri1 , . . . , win , rin) : A(pi) = 1
]
≈ Pr
[
(ck, tk)← SimGen(1k); (x, i1, . . . , in)← ASimComtk(·)(ck, tk);
pi ← SimProvetk(x, ti1 , si1 , . . . , tin , sin) : A(pi) = 1
]
,
where
– tk is a trapdoor key used to construct simulated proofs
– Comck(·) on wi = (ti,mi) ∈ Mck picks uniformly random ri such that (ti, ri) ∈ Rck and returns ci =
Comck(wi; ri)
– SimComtk(·) on wi = (ti,mi) ∈Mck runs (ci, si)← SimComtk(ti) and returns ci, where si is some auxiliary
information used to construct simulated proofs
– A picks (x, i1, . . . , in) such that (ck, x, wi1 , . . . , win) ∈ RL
Comparison to standard zero-knowledge proofs. The commit-and-prove functionality defined above is a generaliza-
tion of standard zero-knowledge proofs. The commitment key corresponds to a common reference string. To give a
proof for x ∈ Lck the prover could commit to the witness and then give a proof. The correctness, soundness and
zero-knowledge properties given above imply that this would yield a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system
for RL.
The generalization to a commit-and-prove functionality is quite useful for efficiency reasons. Using a traditional
zero-knowledge proof system the prover has to start from scratch every time a new statement has to be proved. In a
commit-and-prove system, commitments to values can be reused in multiple proofs, which reduces both computation
and communication.
There are also conceptual advantages to using a commit-and-prove functionality. One is that it is convenient that
the same committed values can be used across multiple proofs. Another one is that we capture in a natural way that
statements may be related to commitments and proofs that have been made before.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Bilinear group
Let G be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input 1k returns (p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, gˆ, hˇ), where Gˆ, Hˇ and T
are groups of prime order p, gˆ and hˇ generate Gˆ and Hˇ respectively, and e : Gˆ× Hˇ→ T is an efficiently computable,
non-degenerate bilinear map.
3 Given two functions f, g : N→ [0, 1] we write f(k) ≈ g(k) when |f(k)− g(k)| = O(k−c) for every positive integer c. We say that f is
negligible when f(k) ≈ 0 and that it is overwhelming when f(k) ≈ 1.
Notation: We will write elements xˆ ∈ Gˆ with a hat and elements yˇ ∈ Hˇ with an inverted hat to make it easy to
distinguish elements from the two groups. We denote the neutral elements in the groups Gˆ, Hˇ and T with 0ˆ, 0ˇ and
0T.
It will be convenient to use additive notation for all three groups Gˆ, Hˇ and T. This notation deviates from standard
practice (Gˆ, Hˇ are sometimes written multiplicatively and T is usually written multiplicatively) but will greatly
simplify our paper and make it possible to use linear algebra concepts such as vectors and matrices in a natural way.
We stress that even though we are using additive notation it is hard to compute discrete logarithms in the groups.
It will also be convenient to write the pairing e with multiplicative notation. So we define
xˆ · yˇ = e(xˆ, yˇ).
Writing the pairing multiplicatively allows us to use linear algebra notation in a natural way, we have for instance
xˆ ·
(
0ˇ yˇ
zˇ 0ˇ
)
e> =
(
xˆyˇ
0T
)
,
for xˆ ∈ Gˆ, yˇ, zˇ ∈ Hˇ and e = (0, 1). Note that as xˆa· yˇ = xˆ·ayˇ we will use the simpler notation xˆayˇ = xˆa· yˇ = xˆ·ayˇ.
3.2 SXDH assumption
Let (p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, gˆ, hˇ) ← G(1k) be a bilinear group. The Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in Gˆ is to
distinguish the two distributions (gˆ, ξgˆ, ρgˆ, ξρgˆ) and (gˆ, ξgˆ, ρgˆ, κgˆ), where ξ, ρ, κ← Zp. The DDH problem in Hˇ is
defined in a similar way.
Definition 5. The Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption holds relative to G if the DDH problems
are computationally hard in both Gˆ and Hˇ for (p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, gˆ, hˇ)← G(1k).
3.3 ElGamal encryption
The ElGamal encryption scheme [EG84] is a public key encryption scheme given by the following algorithms:
– Setup: on input a security parameter 1k, output a cyclic group Gˆ of prime order p, an element gˆ ∈ Gˆ and an
element ξ ← Z∗p. Then, define the public key as pk = (Gˆ, vˆ), where vˆ = (ξgˆ, gˆ)> ∈ Gˆ2×1 and the secret
decryption key as xk = (pk, ξ), where ξ = (−ξ−1 mod p, 1).
– Encrypt: the encryption algorithm takes as input the public key pk and a message xˆ ∈ Gˆ, picks a random r ← Zp
and outputs the ciphertext cˆ = e>xˆ+ vˆr ∈ Gˆ2×1, where e = (0, 1).
– Decrypt: the decryption algorithm takes as input the secret key xk and a ciphertext cˆ ∈ Gˆ2×1 and outputs
xˆ = ξcˆ. Note ξe> = 1 and ξvˆ = 0 so simple linear algebra shows decryption is correct.
The ElGamal encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure if the DDH problem is computationally hard in Gˆ [TY98].
ElGamal encryption can be defined similarly in Hˇ and if the SXDH assumption holds we then have IND-CPA secure
encryption schemes in both Gˆ and Hˇ.
3.4 Pairing-product equations and other types of equations
Using the linear algebra friendly additive notation for group operations and multiplicative notation for the pairing,
we can express the four types of equations given in the introduction (Sec. 1) in a compact way.
Consider elements xˆ1, . . . , xˆm ∈ Gˆ and yˇ1, . . . , yˇn ∈ Hˇ, which may be publicly known constants (called aˆj and
bˇi in the introduction) or secret variables. Let furthermore the matrix Γ = {γij}m,ni=1,j=1 ∈ Zm×np and tT ∈ T be
public values. We can now write the pairing product equation simply as
xˆΓ yˇ = tT,
where xˆ = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆm) and yˇ = (yˇ1, . . . , yˇn)>.
We can in a similar fashion write multi-scalar multiplication equations in Gˆ, multi-scalar multiplication equations
in Hˇ, and quadratic equations in Zp as
xˆΓy = tˆ xΓ yˇ = tˇ xΓy = t
for suitable choices of m,n ∈ N, Γ ∈ Zm×np , xˆ ∈ Gˆ1×m, yˇ ∈ Hˇn×1,x ∈ Z1×mp ,y ∈ Zn×1p , tˆ ∈ Gˆ, tˇ ∈ Hˇ and
t ∈ Zp. The vectors xˆ, yˇ,x,y may contain a mix of known public values and secret variables.
Groth and Sahai [GS12] made the useful observation that by subtracting tˆ · 1, 1 · tˇ and 1 · t on both sides of
the respective equations we may without loss of generality assume tˆ = 0ˆ, tˇ = 0ˇ and t = 0 in all multi-scalar
multiplication equations and quadratic equations. For multi-scalar multiplication equations this has an implicit cost,
though: we need to treat the field element 1 as a variable, as the simulator will need to equivocate it to the field element
0. This means that if all the field elements that appear in the multi-scalar multiplication equation are constants, the
equation will not be treated as a linear equation any more, which have witness-indistinguishable proofs which consist
of 2 group elements. Instead, the zero-knowledge proof will consist of 6 group elements. However, in the special
case where tˆ = gˆ or tˇ = hˇ we will show that we can still treat the equation as a linear equation, which have
zero-knowledge proofs consisting of 2 group elements.
To get zero-knowledge proofs, we will in addition like Groth and Sahai restrict ourselves to tT = 0T in all
pairing product equations. Groth and Sahai [GS12] do not allow pairings of public constants in the pairing product
equations in their zero-knowledge proofs, which we express by requiring the matrix Γ to contain entries γi,j = 0
whenever xˆi and yˇj both are public values. This is because their zero-knowledge simulator breaks down when public
values are paired. Groth and Sahai offers a work-around to deal with public values being paired with each other but
it involves introducing additional multi-scalar multiplication equations and therefore increases the complexity of the
zero-knowledge proof by many group elements. We will show that zero-knowledge simulation is possible when base
elements gˆ or hˇ are paired with each other or other public values. Since we do not need the additional multi-scalar
multiplication equation used in Groth and Sahai’s work-around this yields a significant efficiency gain whenever gˆ
or hˇ are paired with each other or other public values.
4 Commitment keys and commitments
Like in Groth-Sahai proofs, commitment keys come in two flavours: extraction keys that give perfect soundness and
simulation keys that give zero-knowledge. The two types of key generation algorithms are given in Fig. 1 and by the
SXDH assumption extraction keys and simulation keys are computationally indistinguishable.4
ExtGen(1k)
(p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, gˆ, hˇ)← G(1k)
ρ← Zp, ξ ← Z∗p σ ← Zp, ψ ← Z∗p
vˆ ← (ξgˆ, gˆ)> vˇ ← (ψhˇ, hˇ)
wˆ ← ρvˆ wˇ ← σvˇ
uˆ← wˆ + (0ˆ, gˆ)> uˇ← wˇ + (0ˇ, hˇ)
ξ ← (−ξ−1 mod p, 1) ψ ← (−ψ−1 mod p, 1)>
ck ← (p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, uˆ, vˆ, wˆ, uˇ, vˇ, wˇ)
xk ← (ck, ξ,ψ)
Return (ck, xk)
SimGen(1k)
(p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, gˆ, hˇ)← G(1k)
ρ← Zp, ξ ← Z∗p σ ← Zp, ψ ← Z∗p
vˆ ← (ξgˆ, gˆ)> vˇ ← (ψhˇ, hˇ)
wˆ ← ρvˆ − (0ˆ, gˆ)> wˇ ← σvˇ − (0ˇ, hˇ)
uˆ← wˆ + (0ˆ, gˆ)> uˇ← wˇ + (0ˇ, hˇ)
ck ← (p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, uˆ, vˆ, wˆ, uˇ, vˇ, wˇ)
tk ← (ck, ρ, σ)
Return (ck, tk)
Fig. 1: Generator algorithms
The column vectors vˆ, wˆ, uˆ ∈ Gˆ2×1 will be used to make commitments cˆ to group elements xˆ ∈ Gˆ and scalars
x ∈ Zp. Commitments to group elements and scalars are computed as
cˆ← e>xˆ+ vˆr + wˆs and cˆ← uˆx+ vˆr,
4 The commitment keys are not defined exactly as in [GS12]: by defining vˆ as (ξgˆ, gˆ)> instead of (gˆ, ξgˆ)> we will be able to reduce
the computational cost of the prover, as explained in Sec. 9. Besides this small difference, the keys vˆ, wˆ, uˆ, vˇ, wˇ and uˇ correspond to
u1, u2, u, v1, v2 and v in [GS12].
where r, s ∈ Zp. Commitments, usually denoted dˇ, to group elements yˆ ∈ Hˇ and scalars y ∈ Zp are made analo-
gously using the row vectors vˇ, wˇ, uˇ ∈ Hˇ1×2.
The commitment scheme is similar to [GS12], however, we will have several different types of commitments and
the randomness r, s ∈ Zp we use will depend on the type. Fig. 2 summarizes the commitment types and describes
the message, randomness and commitment spaces specified by the public key ck.
t m (r, s) cˆ
(pubGˆ,m) mˆ ∈ Gˆ r = s = 0 cˆ = (0ˆ, mˆ)>
encGˆ mˆ ∈ Gˆ r ∈ Zp, s = 0 cˆ ∈ Gˆ2×1
comGˆ mˆ ∈ Gˆ r, s ∈ Zp cˆ ∈ Gˆ2×1
baseGˆ mˆ = gˆ r = s = 0 cˆ = (0ˆ, gˆ)
>
scaGˆ m ∈ Zp r ∈ Zp, s = 0 cˆ ∈ Gˆ2×1
unitGˆ m = 1 r = s = 0 cˆ = uˆ
t m (r, s) dˇ
(pubHˇ,m) mˇ ∈ Hˇ r = s = 0 dˇ = (0ˇ, mˇ)
encHˇ mˇ ∈ Hˇ r ∈ Zp, s = 0 dˇ ∈ Hˇ1×2
comHˇ mˇ ∈ Hˇ r, s ∈ Zp dˇ ∈ Hˇ1×2
baseHˇ mˇ = hˇ r = s = 0 dˇ = (0ˇ, hˇ)
scaHˇ m ∈ Zp r ∈ Zp, s = 0 dˇ ∈ Hˇ1×2
unitHˇ m = 1 r = s = 0 dˇ = uˇ
Fig. 2:Mck,Rck and Cck.
The type t = (pubGˆ, xˆ) corresponds to a commitment to a public value xˆ using randomness r = s = 0.
It is easy for the verifier to check whether a commitment cˆ = e>xˆ is indeed a correct commitment to a public
value xˆ. Explicitly allowing public values in the commitments simplifies the description of the proofs because we
can now treat all elements xˆ1, . . . , xˆm in a pairing product equation as committed values regardless of whether
they are public or secret. Suppose some of the elements xˆ ∈ Gˆ1×m that appear in a pairing-product equation
are committed as constant and others as Groth-Sahai commitments. The matrix consisting of all the commitments
Cˆ = (cˆ1 · · · cˆm) ∈ Gˆ2×m can be written in a compact way as Cˆ = e>xˆ+ vˆrx + wˆsx, where for a constant xˆi we
just have rxi = 0 and sxi = 0.
In a standard Groth-Sahai proof, group element variables are committed as type t = comGˆ using randomness
r, s ← Zp. We will for greater efficiency also allow commitments of type t = encGˆ where s = 0. A type t = encGˆ
commitment to a group element xˆ is cˆ← e>xˆ+ vˆr, which is an ElGamal encryption of xˆ as described in Sec. 3.3.
Using encryption of variables instead of commitments reduces the computation and in some instances the size of the
proofs. However, even on a simulation key the encryptions are only computationally hiding, so we must take care to
ensure that it is possible to simulate proofs.
We also introduce the type t = baseGˆ for a commitment to the base element gˆ using r = s = 0. This type allows
us to differentiate gˆ from other public values, which is important because the simulation becomes problematic when
public values are paired with each other. However in the special case when gˆ is paired with hˇ or public constants
it is possible to simulate. In addition, one can get shorter zero-knowledge proofs for certain equations by using the
special properties of gˆ and hˇ.
Scalars have the type t = scaGˆ and we use the type t = unitGˆ for a commitment to the scalar 1 using r = s = 0.
Please note that t = unitGˆ suffices to incorporate any public value a ∈ Zp into our equations by multiplying the
corresponding row in the matrix Γ with a. With these two types we can therefore commit to both variables and
constants in Zp, which simplifies the description of the proofs.
We have now described the types of commitments in Gˆ and similar types for commitments in Hˇ are given in
Fig. 2. The commitment algorithm is described in Fig. 3.
Input Randomness Output
(pubGˆ, xˆ), xˆ r ← 0, s← 0 cˆ← e>xˆ
encGˆ, xˆ (?) r ← Zp, s← 0 cˆ← e>xˆ+ vˆr
comGˆ, xˆ r ← Zp, s← Zp cˆ← e>xˆ+ vˆr + wˆs
baseGˆ, gˆ (?) r ← 0, s← 0 cˆ← e>gˆ
scaGˆ, x r ← Zp, s← 0 cˆ← uˆx+ vˆr
unitGˆ, 1 r ← 0, s← 0 cˆ← uˆ
Input Randomness Output
(pubHˇ, yˇ), yˇ r ← 0, s← 0 dˇ← yˇe
encHˇ, yˇ (?) r ← Zp, s← 0 dˇ← yˇe+ rvˇ
comHˇ, yˇ r ← Zp, s← Zp dˇ← yˇe+ rvˇ + swˇ
baseHˇ, hˇ (?) r ← 0, s← 0 dˇ← hˇe
scaHˇ, y r ← Zp, s← 0 dˇ← yuˇ+ rvˇ
unitHˇ, 1 r ← 0, s← 0 dˇ← uˇ
Fig. 3: Commitment algorithm. The commitments marked with (?) were not defined in [GS12].
The extraction key xk includes a vector ξ such that ξvˆ = ξwˆ = 0ˆ and ξe> = 1, ξuˆ = gˆ. On a commitment to
a group element cˆ = e>xˆ + vˆr + wˆs or on an encryption to a group element cˆ = e>xˆ + vˆr we can extract xˆ by
computing xˆ = ξcˆ. On a commitment to a scalar cˆ = uˆx+ vˆr we extract gˆx = ξcˆ, which uniquely determines the
committed value x. The extraction algorithm is given in Fig. 4.
Extxk(t, cˆ) where cˆ ∈ Gˆ2×1
Return xˆ← ξcˆ
Extxk(t, dˇ) where dˇ ∈ Hˇ1×2
Return yˇ ← dˇψ
Fig. 4: Extraction algorithm.
The simulated commitment algorithm SimComtk(t) is described in Fig. 5. Essentially it commits honestly to
public constants, base elements gˆ, hˇ and units 1, which is easy to verify using public information. For all other types
it commits to 0.
Input Randomness Output
(pubGˆ, xˆ) r ← 0, s← 0 cˆ← e>xˆ
encGˆ r ← Zp, s← 0 cˆ← vˆr
comGˆ r ← Zp, s← Zp cˆ← vˆr + wˆs
baseGˆ r ← 0, s← 0 cˆ← e>gˆ
scaGˆ r ← Zp, s← 0 cˆ← vˆr
unitGˆ r ← 0, s← 0 cˆ← uˆ
Input Randomness Output
(pubHˇ, yˇ) r ← 0, s← 0 dˇ← yˇe
encHˇ r ← Zp, s← 0 dˇ← rvˇ
comHˇ r ← Zp, s← Zp dˇ← rvˇ + swˇ
baseHˇ r ← 0, s← 0 dˇ← hˇe
scaHˇ r ← Zp, s← 0 dˇ← rvˇ
unitHˇ r ← 0, s← 0 dˇ← uˇ
Fig. 5: Simulation algorithm for commitments.
On a simulation key, the commitments of types comGˆ or scaGˆ are perfectly hiding. Commitments of types
(pubGˆ, xˆ) or encGˆ on the other hand are perfectly binding. However, by the SXDH assumption commitments of
type encGˆ cannot be distinguished from commitments to other elements. Commitments of type (pubGˆ, xˆ) are public,
so we do not require any hiding property.
Commitments to gˆ and 1 of types baseGˆ and unitGˆ are interesting. The secret simulation key specifies ρ such that
uˆ = ρvˆ and e>gˆ = ρvˆ − wˆ. This means that commitments of types baseGˆ and unitGˆ can be equivocated as either
commitments to gˆ and 1 or as commitments to 0ˆ and 0. The zero-knowledge simulator will use the equivocations to
simulate proofs involving the base element gˆ or constants in Zp.
5 Proofs
We will first explain how the proofs work using the example of pairing product equations to give intuition. We want
to prove that committed values xˆ, yˇ satisfy the equation
xˆΓ yˇ = 0T.
Assume that we have committed to xˆ, yˇ as Cˆ = e>xˆ+ vˆrx + wˆsx and Dˇ = yˇe+ ryvˇ + sywˇ. We then have
CˆΓ Dˇ =(e>xˆ+ vˆrx + wˆsx)Γ (yˇe+ ryvˇ + sywˇ)
=e>xˆΓ yˇe+ vˆrxΓDˇ + wˆsxΓDˇ + e>xˆΓryvˇ + e>xˆΓsywˇ
=0T + vˆpˇi
′
vˆ + wˆpˇi
′
wˆ + pˆi
′
vˇvˇ + pˆi
′
wˇwˇ
where pˇi′vˆ = rxΓDˇ, pˇi
′
wˆ = sxΓDˇ, pˆi
′
vˇ = e
>xˆΓry, pˆi′wˇ = e>xˆΓsy.
The prover randomizes pˇi′vˆ, pˇi
′
wˆ, pˆi
′
vˇ, pˆi
′
wˇ as pˇivˆ = pˇi
′
vˆ + αvˇ + βwˇ, pˇiwˆ = pˇi
′
wˆ + γvˇ + δwˇ, pˆivˇ = pˆi
′
vˇ − vˆα− wˆγ,
pˆiwˇ = pˆi
′
wˇ − vˆβ − wˆδ. This gives us a randomized proof pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ, pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ satisfying the verification equation
CˆΓ Dˇ = vˆpˇivˆ + wˆpˇiwˆ + pˆivˇvˇ + pˆiwˇwˇ.
Soundness and F -knowledge. An extraction key xk contains ξ,ψ such that ξvˆ = ξwˆ = 0ˆ and vˇψ = wˇψ = 0ˇ.
Multiplying the verification equation by ξ and ψ on the left and right side respectively, we get
ξCˆΓ Dˇψ = ξvˆpˇivˆψ + ξwˆpˇiwˆψ + ξpˆivˇvˇψ + ξpˆiwˇwˇψ = 0T.
Observe, xˆ = ξCˆ are the values the extractor Extxk gets from the commitments Cˆ and yˇ = Dˇψ are the values
the extractor Extxk gets from the commitments Dˇ. The extracted values from the commitments therefore satisfy
xˆΓ yˇ = 0T. This gives us perfect soundness and perfect F -knowledge, where F on group elements in Gˆ and Hˇ is
the identity function.
Zero-knowledge. The simulator will simulate proofs by equivocating the commitments to values xˆ, yˇ that satisfy
the equation xˆΓ yˇ = 0T. On a simulation key, commitments with types comGˆ, comHˇ are perfectly hiding. The
simulator can therefore use xˆi = 0ˆ or yˇj = 0ˇ. Commitments with types baseGˆ, baseHˇ are also equivocable to 0ˆ
or 0ˇ since on a simulation key e>gˆ = vˆρ − wˆ and hˇe = σvˇ − wˇ. By using equivocations to 0ˆ and 0ˇ we can
now ensure that xˆiγi,j yˇj = 0T whenever txi ∈ {baseGˆ, comGˆ} or tyj ∈ {baseHˇ, comHˇ}. Commitments of type
txi ∈ {(pubGˆ, xˆ), encGˆ} and tyj ∈ {(pubHˇ, yˇ), encHˇ} cannot be equivocated and, to get zero-knowledge, we will
therefore assume γi,j = 0 whenever such types are paired (as is also the case in [GS12]).
We now have that the simulator can equivocate commitments and base elements to 0ˆ and 0ˇ such that the resulting
xˆ, yˇ satisfy xˆΓ yˇ = 0T. The randomization of the proofs ensures that they will not leak information about whether
we are giving a real proof or simulating. Recall the prover randomized pˇi′vˆ, pˇi
′
wˆ, pˆi
′
vˇ, pˆi
′
wˇ as pˇivˆ = pˇi
′
vˆ + αvˇ + βwˇ,
pˇiwˆ = pˇi
′
wˆ + γvˇ + δwˇ, pˆivˇ = pˆi
′
vˇ − vˆα − wˆγ, pˆiwˇ = pˆi′wˇ − vˆβ − wˆδ. On a simulation key this means regardless
of whether we are giving a real proof or a simulated proof pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ are uniformly random and pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ are the unique
values that make the verification equation true. Finally, the encrypted elements are computationally hidden by the
SXDH assumption, so here the simulator may use encryptions of 0ˆ and 0ˇ instead of the witness and as we shall show
the proofs can be constructed on top of the ciphertexts such that they do not reveal whether the underlying plaintext
are part of a real witness or are set to zero by the simulator.
Optimizations. Now let us return to the prover. Observe that rx, sx, ry, sy may have some zero elements. In par-
ticular, assume that all elements in sx are 0. This happens if all xˆi in the statement have types encGˆ, (pubGˆ, xˆi) or
baseGˆ. Moreover, assume that all elements yˇ have as types either comHˇ or baseHˇ so that a simulator uses yˇ = 0ˇ
in the simulated proof. This sets pˇi′wˆ = 0ˇ. As pˇi
′
wˆ is the same for all witnesses, even for “simulated witnesses”, we
might as well set γ = δ = 0. This gives us a proof that consists of 4 elements in Gˆ and 2 elements in Hˇ instead
of 4 elements both in Gˆ and Hˇ. For such equations, we therefore save 2 group elements or 25% of the proof size
compared to Groth and Sahai [GS12] where there is no encGˆ or encHˇ types. We refer to Fig. 9 for the list of equation
types and the corresponding proof sizes.
5.1 The full proof system
We divide the possible statements into 16 different types. They are summarized in Fig. 6, which provides an algorithm
for checking that the statement format is correct.
The relation RL is defined in Fig. 7, which provides an algorithm to check whether a statement is true. The
relation first checks that the types of the witnesses and the types of the equations match according to Fig. 6 and then
whether the relevant pairing product, multi-scalar multiplication or quadratic equation is satisfied.
The prover and verifier are given in Fig. 8. The prover constructs a proof for the relevant type of equation
assuming the input is a correctly formatted statement with valid openings of commitments to a satisfying witness.
The verifier uses the matching verification equation to check validity of a proof.
As described earlier there are some types of equations where parts of the proof are just 0 or can be compressed.
In Fig. 9 we show the parts of the proofs that allow reduced communication for each type of equation and, if the
proof is shortened, we explain how it is done.
Let F be given by
F (ck, t, xˆ) = xˆ for t ∈ {(pubGˆ, xˆ), encGˆ, comGˆ, baseGˆ}
F (ck, t, x) = gˆx for t ∈ {scaGˆ, unitGˆ}
F (ck, t, yˆ) = yˇ for t ∈ {(pubHˇ, yˇ), encHˇ, comHˇ, baseHˇ}
F (ck, t, y) = yhˇ for t ∈ {scaHˇ, unitHˇ}
.
CheckFormatck(T, Γ, {txi}mi=1, {tyj}nj=1)
Check Γ ∈ Zm×np
Check that the equation and message types match each other according to the table below
T tx1 , . . . , txm ty1 , . . . , tyn
PPE baseGˆ, (pubGˆ, xˆi), encGˆ, comGˆ baseHˇ, (pubHˇ, yˇj), encHˇ, comHˇ
PEncGˆ baseGˆ, (pubGˆ, xˆi), encGˆ baseHˇ, comHˇ
PConstGˆ baseGˆ, (pubGˆ, xˆi) baseHˇ, comHˇ
PEncHˇ baseGˆ, comGˆ baseHˇ, (pubHˇ, yˇj), encHˇ
PConstHˇ baseGˆ, comGˆ baseHˇ, (pubHˇ, yˇj)
MEGˆ baseGˆ, (pubGˆ, xˆi), encGˆ, comGˆ unitHˇ, scaHˇ
MEncGˆ baseGˆ, (pubGˆ, xˆi), encGˆ unitHˇ, scaHˇ
MConstGˆ baseGˆ, (pubGˆ, xˆi) unitHˇ, scaHˇ
MLinGˆ baseGˆ, comGˆ unitHˇ
MEHˇ unitGˆ, scaGˆ baseHˇ, (pubHˇ, yˇj), encHˇ, comHˇ
MEncHˇ unitGˆ, scaGˆ baseHˇ, (pubHˇ, yˇj), encHˇ
MConstHˇ unitGˆ, scaGˆ baseHˇ, (pubHˇ, yˇj)
MLinHˇ unitGˆ baseHˇ, comHˇ
QE unitGˆ, scaGˆ unitHˇ, scaHˇ
QConstGˆ unitGˆ unitHˇ, scaHˇ
QConstHˇ unitGˆ, scaGˆ unitHˇ
If T = PPE check Γi,j = 0 for all (i, j) where txi ∈ {(pubGˆ, xˆi), encGˆ} and tyj ∈ {(pubHˇ, yˇj), encHˇ}
Accept format if all checks pass, else abort
Fig. 6: Equation - message types check
RL(ck, (T, Γ ), ({(txi , xi)}mi=1, {(tyj , yj)}nj=1))
CheckFormatck(T, Γ, {txi}mi=1, {tyj}nj=1)
For all i, j check (txi , xi) ∈Mck and (tyj , yj) ∈Mck
If x ∈ Gˆm and y ∈ Hˇn check xΓy = 0T
If x ∈ Gˆm and y ∈ Znp check xΓy = 0ˆ
If x ∈ Zmp and y ∈ Hˇn check xΓy = 0ˇ
If x ∈ Zmp and y ∈ Znp check xΓy = 0
Accept if and only if all checks pass
Fig. 7: Relation that defines the key-dependent languages for our proofs
Proveck(T, Γ, {(txi , xi, (rxi , sxi))}mi=1, {(tyj , yj , (ryj , syj ))}nj=1)
If x ∈ Gˆm define Cˆ = e>x+ vˆrx + wˆsx else if x ∈ Zmp define Cˆ = uˆx+ vˆrx
If y ∈ Hˇn define Dˇ = ye+ ryvˇ + sywˇ else if y ∈ Znp define Dˇ = yuˇ+ ryvˇ
Set α = β = γ = δ = 0
If T = PPE pick α, β, γ, δ ← Zp
If T ∈ {PEncGˆ,MEHˇ} pick α, β ← Zp
If T ∈ {PEncHˇ,MEGˆ} pick α, γ ← Zp
If T ∈ {MEncGˆ,MEncHˇ,QE} pick α← Zp
pˇivˆ ← rxΓDˇ + αvˇ + βwˇ pˆivˇ ← (Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γry − vˆα− wˆγ
pˇiwˆ ← sxΓDˇ + γvˇ + δwˇ pˆiwˇ ← (Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γsy − vˆβ − wˆδ
Return pi = (pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ, pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ)
Verifyck(T, Γ, {(txi , cˆi)}mi=1, {(tyj , dˇj)}nj=1, pi)
CheckFormatck(T, Γ, {txi}mi=1, {tyj}nj=1)
Check Cˆ = (cˆ1 · · · cˆm) ∈ Gˆ2×m and Dˇ =
(
dˇ1 · · · dˇn
)> ∈ Hˇn×2
Check pi = (pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ, pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ) ∈ Hˇ2×1 × Hˇ2×1 × Gˆ1×2 × Gˆ1×2
Check CˆΓ Dˇ = vˆpˇivˆ + wˆpˇiwˆ + pˆivˇvˇ + pˆiwˇwˇ
Return 1 if all checks pass, else return 0
Fig. 8: Prover and verifier algorithms
T pˇivˆ pˇiwˆ pˆivˇ pˆiwˇ Gˆ Hˇ Zp
PPE pˇivˆ pˇiwˆ pˆivˇ pˆiwˇ 4 4 0
PEncGˆ (?) pˇivˆ 0ˇ pˆivˇ pˆiwˇ 4 2 0
PConstGˆ 0ˇ 0ˇ e
>(xˆΓry) e>(xˆΓsy) 2 0 0
PEncHˇ (?) pˇivˆ pˇiwˆ pˆivˇ 0ˆ 2 4 0
PConstHˇ (rxΓ yˇ)e (sxΓ yˇ)e 0ˆ 0ˆ 0 2 0
MEGˆ pˇivˆ pˇiwˆ pˆivˇ 0ˆ 2 4 0
MEncGˆ (?) pˇivˆ 0ˆ pˆivˇ 0ˆ 2 2 0
MConstGˆ 0ˇ 0ˇ e
>(xˆΓry) 0ˆ 1 0 0
MLinGˆ (rxΓy)uˇ (sxΓy)uˇ 0ˆ 0ˆ 0 0 2
MEHˇ pˇivˆ 0ˇ pˆivˇ pˆiwˇ 4 2 0
MEncHˇ (?) pˇivˆ 0ˇ pˆivˇ 0ˆ 2 2 0
MConstHˇ (rxΓ yˇ)e 0ˇ 0ˆ 0ˆ 0 1 0
MLinHˇ 0ˇ 0ˇ uˆ(xΓry) uˆ(xΓsy) 0 0 2
QE pˇivˆ 0ˇ pˆivˇ 0ˆ 2 2 0
QConstGˆ 0ˇ 0ˇ uˆ(xΓry) 0ˆ 0 0 1
QConstHˇ (rxΓy)uˇ 0ˇ 0ˆ 0ˆ 0 0 1
Fig. 9: Size of an NIZK proof for each type of equation. The size of the NIZK proofs are the same
as in [GS12], except for the equation types marked with (?), which were not defined in [GS12].
Theorem 1. The commit-and-prove scheme given in Figs. 1,3,4 and 8 has perfect correctness, perfect soundness
and F -knowledge for the function F defined above, and computational composable zero-knowledge if the SXDH
assumption holds relative to G.
The description of the zero-knowledge simulator is given in Sec. 6. The proof of the theorem follows from Lem-
mas 1, 2 and 3 given in Sec. 7.
6 Zero-Knowledge simulator
Simulation. The simulator gets as input a well-formed statement where the equation and message types match.
Unlike the prover, the simulator does not know the witness. Some of the simulator’s inputs xi and yj will correspond
to public values, base elements and units, while others have been generated with the simulated commitments and are
0. Having the secret simulation key the simulator can equivocate the baseGˆ, unitGˆ and baseHˇ, unitHˇ type commitments
to 0. This enables it to get a satisfying witness for the statement and using this simulated witness it can now create
the proof as an honest prover would do. The simulator algorithm is detailed in Fig. 10.
7 Security proofs for the commit-and-prove scheme
Lemma 1. The commit-and-prove scheme has perfect correctness.
Proof. The prover gets a statement and valid witness (ck, (T, Γ ), {(txi , xi)}mi=1, {(tyn , yn)}nj=1) ∈ RL, which
guarantees the statement is correctly formatted, (txi , xi), (tyj , yj) ∈ Mck and the vectors x = (x1, . . . , xm) and
y = (y1, . . . , yn)
> fall into one out of four cases given below.
Case Implication
x ∈ Gˆ1×m,y ∈ Hˇn×1 and xΓy = 0T e>xΓye = 0T
x ∈ Gˆ1×m,y ∈ Zn×1p and xΓy = 0ˆ e>xΓyuˇ = 0T
x ∈ Z1×mp ,y ∈ Hˇn×1 and xΓy = 0ˇ uˆxΓye = 0T
x ∈ Z1×mp ,y ∈ Zn×1p and xΓy = 0 uˆxΓyuˇ = 0T
The prover’s input also satisfies (txi , (rxi , sxi)), (tyj , (ryj , syj )) ∈ Rck. For x ∈ Zmp this gives us sx = 0 and we
can write Cˆ = uˆx+ vˆrx + wˆsx. Similarly, for y ∈ Znp it gives us sy = 0 and we can write Dˇ = yuˇ+ ryvˇ+ sywˇ.
This means that for each of the four cases
(Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γ (Dˇ − ryvˇ − sywˇ) = 0T.
SimProvetk(T, Γ, {(txi , (xi, rxi , sxi))}mi=1, {(tyj , (yj , ryj , syj ))}nj=1)
Modify some values according to the following tables
T txi xi, rxi , sxi
PPE, PEncHˇ, PConstHˇ,MLinGˆ baseGˆ xi ← 0ˆ, rxi ← ρ, sxi ← −1
MEHˇ,MEncHˇ,MConstHˇ,QE,QConstHˇ unitGˆ xi ← 0, rxi ← ρ, sxi ← 0
T tyj yj , ryj , syj
PPE, PEncGˆ, PConstGˆ,MLinHˇ baseHˇ yj ← 0ˇ, ryj ← σ, syj ← −1
MEGˆ,MEncGˆ,MConstGˆ,QE,QConstGˆ unitHˇ yj ← 0, ryj ← σ, syj ← 0
If x ∈ Gˆm define Cˆ = e>x+ vˆrx + wˆsx else if x ∈ Zmp define Cˆ = uˆx+ vˆrx
If y ∈ Hˇn define Dˇ = ye+ ryvˇ + sywˇ else if y ∈ Znp define Dˇ = yuˇ+ ryvˇ
Set α = β = γ = δ = 0
If T = PPE pick α, β, γ, δ ← Zp
If T ∈ {PEncGˆ,MEHˇ} pick α, β ← Zp
If T ∈ {PEncHˇ,MEGˆ} pick α, γ ← Zp
If T ∈ {MEncGˆ,MEncHˇ,QE} pick α← Zp
pˇivˆ ← rxΓDˇ + αvˇ + βwˇ pˆivˇ ← (Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γry − vˆα− wˆγ
pˇiwˆ ← sxΓDˇ + γvˇ + δwˇ pˆiwˇ ← (Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γsy − vˆβ − wˆδ
Return pi = (pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ, pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ)
Fig. 10: Simulator algorithm
This fact gives us that the verification equation used by the verifier holds.
CˆΓ Dˇ = (Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)ΓDˇ + vˆrxΓDˇ + wˆsxΓDˇ
= (Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γ (Dˇ − ryvˇ − sywˇ) + (Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γryvˇ + (Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γsywˇ
+ vˆrxΓDˇ + wˆsxΓDˇ + vˆ(α− α)vˇ + vˆ(β − β)wˇ + wˆ(γ − γ)vˇ + wˆ(δ − δ)wˇ
= 0T +
(
(Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γry − vˆα− wˆγ
)
vˇ +
(
(Cˆ − vˆrx − wˆsx)Γsy − vˆβ − wˆδ
)
wˇ
+ vˆ(rxΓDˇ + αvˇ + βwˇ) + wˆ(sxΓDˇ + γvˇ + δwˇ)
= pˆivˇvˇ + pˆiwˇwˇ + vˆpˇivˆ + wˆpˇiwˆ.
uunionsq
Lemma 2. The commit-and-prove scheme has perfect soundness and perfect F -knowledge.
Proof. The verifier checks that the statement is correctly formatted, the commitments are valid and the proof is
well-formed. Finally, the verifier checks that the commitments organized into matrices Cˆ and Dˇ satisfy
CˆΓ Dˇ = vˆpˇivˆ + wˆpˇiwˆ + pˆivˇvˇ + pˆiwˇwˇ.
Recall ExtGen returns ξ,ψ such that ξvˆ = ξwˆ = 0ˆ and vˇψ = wˇψ = 0ˇ. Multiplying by ξ and ψ on the left and
right side respectively, we get
ξCˆΓ Dˇψ = ξvˆpˇivˆψ + ξwˆpˇiwˆψ + ξpˆivˇvˇψ + ξpˆiwˇwˇψ = 0T.
Observe, xˆ = ξCˆ are the values the extractor Extxk gets from the commitments (tx1 , cˆ1), . . . , (txm , cˆn) and yˇ =
Dˇψ are the values the extractor Extxk gets from the commitments (ty1 , dˇ1), . . . , (tyn , dˇn). The extracted values
from the commitments therefore satisfy
xˆΓ yˇ = 0T.
If the equation is a pairing product equation, this directly gives us both perfect soundness and perfect F -knowledge.
If the equation is a multi-scalar multiplication equation in Hˇ, then the committed value is x = loggˆ xˆ. Then the
opened values satisfy xΓ yˇ = 0ˇ, which gives us perfect soundness and perfect F -knowledge. The case of a multi-
scalar multiplication in Gˆ is similar. Finally, for quadratic equations over Zp the committed values are x = loggˆ xˆ,
y = loghˇ yˇ and they satisfy xΓy = 0, which gives us perfect soundness and perfect F -knowledge. uunionsq
Lemma 3. The commit-and-prove scheme is composable zero-knowledge if the SXDH assumption holds relative to
G.
Proof. We first recall what the Gen and SimGen algorithms are. Both algorithms output a commitment key which
specifies a prime order bilinear group (p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, gˆ, hˇ) and elements vˆ, wˆ, uˆ, vˇ, wˇ, uˇ. The only difference be-
tween Gen and SimGen (besides the fact that SimGen outputs a simulation trapdoor) is that in Gen, the elements
are of the form vˆ = (gˆ, ξgˆ)>, vˇ = (hˇ, hˇψ), wˆ = ρvˆ, wˇ = σvˇ, uˆ = ρvˆ + e>gˆ, uˇ = σvˇ + ehˇ, whereas in SimGen
the elements are of the form vˆ = (gˆ, ξgˆ)>, vˇ = (hˇ, ψhˇ), wˆ = ρvˆ − e>gˆ, wˇ = σvˆ − ehˇ, uˆ = ρvˆ, uˇ = σvˇ.
Under the SXDH assumption, the distribution of the elements vˆ, wˆ, uˆ, vˇ, wˇ, uˇ generated by Gen is computa-
tionally indistinguishable from the distribution of the elements vˆ, wˆ, uˆ, vˇ, wˇ, uˇ generated by SimGen. This shows
that the first requirement of composable zero-knowledge is satisfied.
For the second requirement, we first give a high level description of the simulator in Fig. 10.
– For elements in the witness such that t ∈ {comGˆ, scaGˆ, comHˇ, scaHˇ}, the simulator will create commitments to
m = 0ˆ,m = 0ˇ or m = 0 according to the type. These commitments are perfectly hiding under the commitment
key output by SimGen.
– For elements in the witness such that t ∈ {baseGˆ, unitGˆ, baseHˇ, unitHˇ}, the simulator will use the simulation
trapdoor tk to be able to treat them as commitments to 0ˆ, 0ˇ or 0 according to t.
– For elements in the witness such that t ∈ {encGˆ, encHˇ}, the commitments are computed as encryptions of 0ˆ and
0ˇ respectively.
– Having obtained satisfying openings of the commitments the simulator creates the proof as an honest prover
would do with those values.
We now argue that a simulated proof is computationally indistinguishable from an honestly generated proof when
the commitment key is output using SimGen. To show that, we define three games and use a hybrid argument.
– Game 1 is the game where the commitment key is output using SimGen and the proof is done using a valid
witness.
– Game 2 is as Game 1, but instead of using a valid witness, commitments with t ∈ {comGˆ, scaGˆ, comHˇ, scaHˇ}
are done to m = 0ˆ,m = 0ˇ or m = 0, and commitments with t ∈ {baseGˆ, unitGˆ, baseHˇ, unitHˇ} are equivocated
as commitments to 0ˆ, 0ˇ or 0, according to t and T as described in Fig. 10.
– Game 3 is as Game 2, but commitments with t ∈ {encGˆ, encHˇ} are changed for encryptions of 0ˆ, 0ˇ according to
t. Note that Game 3 is equivalent to the simulation.
Game 1 and Game 2 are perfectly indistinguishable due to the fact that commitments with t ∈ {comGˆ, scaGˆ, comHˇ,
scaHˇ} are perfectly hiding and the uniformity of the randomized proofs, which we prove in Lemma 4. Equivocating
the commitments with t ∈ {baseGˆ, unitGˆ, baseHˇ, unitHˇ} as commitments to 0ˆ, 0ˇ or 0 only changes the proofs and not
the commitments themselves, so this case is also indistinguishable by Lemma 4.
Game 2 and Game 3 are computationally indistinguishable due to the IND-CPA security of ElGamal. Note that, in
Game 2 and Game 3, the equation is satisfied for any value of the elements in the witness such that t ∈ {encGˆ, encHˇ}.
Actually, for each element xˆi and yˇj we can just get the corresponding ciphertext cˆi or dˇj and build the proof on top
of it. We can do this because all the terms of the proof which have to be computed using the ciphertext’s randomness
will be 0 as the element paired to the randomness is going to be 0 due to the restrictions on the equation5. This allows
us to reduce the computational indistinguishability of Game 2 and Game 3 to the IND-CPA security of ElGamal. uunionsq
Lemma 4. Proofs are uniformly random over solutions to the verification equations when the commitment key is
generated using SimGen.
Proof. In all games from Game 1 to Game 3, all witnesses will yield proofs satisfying the verification equation by
perfect completeness. Let us now argue that these proofs are uniformly random over the possible solutions to the
verification equation. Observe that, as the commitment key is generated using SimGen, we have that vˆ, wˆ generate
5 Strictly speaking, if the proofs are computed using the algorithm given in Fig. 10, then this argument is only true for encryptions of
elements in Hˇ. However, the proofs can be written in an alternative way by changing the role of Gˆ and Hˇ so that the same argument holds
for encryptions of elements in Gˆ
Gˆ1×2, vˇ, wˇ generate Hˇ2×1, uˆ ∈ 〈vˆ〉 and uˇ ∈ 〈vˇ〉. From now on, let us define the pre-proofs as those proofs that
satisfy the verification equation but haven’t been randomized yet, for instance, pˆi′vˇ = e>xˆΓry.
We will prove either that there is only one proof which is accepted by the verification equation or that when
there are many possible proofs both honestly generated and simulated proofs will be uniformly distributed among
all valid proofs, i.e., among all solutions to the verification equations. In the first case, by using the techniques used
in [GS12] it is easy to see that when pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ (resp. pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ) are 0 there is only one value for pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ (resp. pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ)
which satisfies the verification equation. In the latter case, we will show that pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ (resp. pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ) are uniformly
random, and using the techniques from [GS12] it is easy to see that for fixed values for pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ (resp. pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ) there
is only one value for pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ (resp. pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ) which satisfies the verification equation. If some of pˇi′vˆ, pˇi
′
wˆ, pˆi
′
vˇ, pˆi
′
wˇ are
already 0 due to the type of equation, we will not randomize them. The reason is that due to the restrictions on the
equation types, if for a honestly generated proof some of pˇi′vˆ, pˇi
′
wˆ, pˆi
′
vˇ, pˆi
′
wˇ are 0 then the zero-knowledge simulator
will be able to construct simulated proofs such that the same parts of the proof are 0. Therefore, all valid proofs will
be such that the same parts of the proof are 0, so these components will not need to be randomized.
For each type of equation, we now detail whether pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ (or pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ) are 0 or whether pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ (or pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ) are
uniformly random, where we assume that α, β, γ, δ ← Zp:
For T = PPE, pˇivˆ = pˇi′vˆ + αvˇ + βwˇ, pˇiwˆ = pˇi
′
wˆ + γvˇ + δwˇ are uniformly distributed. For T = PEncGˆ,
pˇivˆ = pˇi
′
vˆ + αvˇ + βwˇ is uniformly distributed and pˇiwˆ = 0 (similarly for T = PEncHˇ). For T = PConstGˆ,
pˇivˆ = pˇiwˆ = 0 (similarly for T = PConstHˇ).
For T = MEGˆ, pˆivˇ = pˆi
′
vˇ + αvˆ + βwˆ is uniformly distributed and pˆiwˇ = 0. For T = MEncGˆ, pˇivˆ = pˇi
′
vˆ + αvˇ is
uniformly distributed and pˇiwˆ = 0. For T = MConstGˆ, pˇivˆ, pˇiwˆ = 0. For T = MLinGˆ, pˆivˇ, pˆiwˇ = 0. (Similarly for
T ∈ {MEHˇ,MEncHˇ,MConstHˇ,MLinHˇ}).
For T = QE, pˆivˇ = pˆi′vˇ + αvˆ is uniformly distributed and pˆiwˇ = 0. For T = QConstGˆ, pˇivˆ = pˇiwˆ = 0 (similarly
for T = QConstHˇ). uunionsq
8 Applications of our results
In [BCKL08] the authors give a construction of a P-Signature scheme in asymmetric bilinear groups. This construc-
tion uses Groth-Sahai proofs based on the SXDH instantiation. The statements that have to be proven are such that
our techniques can be applied to have better efficiency. Concretely, in the construction given in the paper each P-
signature proof consists of 18 elements in Gˆ and 16 elements in Hˇ. Using our techniques, we can get 16 elements
in Gˆ and 16 elements in Hˇ. In the full version of [BCKL08], they give another construction in which our techniques
could be applied too, bringing the 12 elements in Gˆ and 10 elements in Hˇ that they need to 10 elements in Gˆ and
10 elements in Hˇ. In addition, in the equations that appear in their scheme, the constant terms in T that appear are
of the form e(gˆ, hˇ). Using Groth-Sahai proofs, to get NIZK proofs they would need to add extra commitments and
proofs. This is why they do not use NIZK proofs but NIWI proofs. However, using our techniques the same proofs
are actually NIZK proofs, without increasing the number of elements needed. It would be interesting to see if this
would result in more efficient P-signature schemes.
Another example is [AFG+10], which defines structure-preserving signatures, i.e., signature schemes where the
messages, signatures and verification keys are group elements and where the verification predicate is a conjunction
of pairing-product equations. This definition makes structure-preserving signatures particularly well-suited for the
application of Groth-Sahai proofs. One of their applications of structure-preserving signatures given in [AFG+10]
is a blind signature scheme in which Groth-Sahai proofs are used. To obtain a blind signature, the user commits to
several elements and proves in zero-knowledge that some relations are satisfied. These are relations in which we
can apply our techniques to get better efficiency. Concretely, the output of the Obtain protocol of the blind signature
scheme consists of 18 elements in Gˆ and 16 elements in Hˇ, and using our techniques the output of the protocol can
be reduced to 16 elements in Gˆ and 14 elements in Hˇ.
9 NIZK proofs with prover-chosen CRS
In Groth-Sahai proofs, the prover uses a common reference string shared between the prover and the verifier to
construct NIZK proofs. We can improve efficiency by letting the prover choose her own common reference string,
which we will refer to as her public key. The public key has to be created as a perfectly binding key, otherwise the
soundness of the NIZK proof could be easily broken by the prover. The prover will then have to prove to the verifier
that her public key has been created as a perfectly binding key. To do that the prover will give an NIZK proof using
the shared common reference string. The definitions for commit-and-prove schemes with prover-chosen CRS are
given in Sec. 9.1. In Secs. 9.2 to 9.4 we explain how the prover creates her public key, proves its well-formedness
and we detail what the efficiency improvement obtained is. Finally, in Sec. 9.5 we prove the security of our scheme.
9.1 Definitions for prover-chosen CRS commit-and-prove schemes
The definitions given in Sec. 2 are not suitable for the scenario where the prover chooses her own common reference
string . The reason is that the prover will only communicate her public key pk to the verifier once, and the public key
pk will be used to generate and verify commitments and proofs.
Therefore, we define extended commit-and-prove schemes for a relation RL, which capture the fact that the
prover chooses her own public key. We will only consider the common reference string model, where the prover
makes a well-formedness NIZK proof for her pk by using the shared common reference string between the prover
and the verifier. In particular, we are not considering the multi-string model [GO07] nor the scenario where the prover
gets a certificate on her public key. The definitions can be naturally extended to those settings.
The definitions share many elements with the definitions given in Sec. 2. We may commit to different values
w1, . . . , wN and prove for different statements x that a subset of the committed values w = (wi1 , . . . , win) constitute
a witness for x ∈ Lck, i.e., (ck, x, w) ∈ RL. We will also divide each committed value into two parts wi = (ti,mi).
An extended commit-and-prove scheme ECP = (Gen,CreatePK,VerifyPK,Com,Prove,Verify) consists of
six algorithms. The algorithms Gen,CreatePK,Prove are probabilistic and the algorithms VerifyPK,Com,Verify
are deterministic.
Gen(1k): Generates a commitment key ck. The commitment key specifies a message space Mck, a randomness
spaceRck and a commitment space Cck. Membership of either space can be decided efficiently.
CreatePK(ck): Given a commitment key ck, returns a public key pk, a secret key sk and a well-formedness proof
pipk.
VerifyPKck(pk, pipk): Given a commitment key ck, a public key pk and a well-formedness proof pipk returns 1
(accept) or 0 (reject).
Comck,sk(t,m; r): Given a commitment key ck, a secret key sk, a message (t,m) ∈ Mck and randomness r such
that (t, r) ∈ Rck returns a commitment c such that (t, c) ∈ Cck.
Proveck,sk(x, (t1,m1, r1), . . . , (tn,mn, rn)): Given a commitment key ck, a secret key sk, a statement x, and com-
mitment openings such that (ti,mi) ∈Mck, (ti, ri) ∈ Rck and (ck, x, t1,m1, . . . , tn,mn) ∈ RL returns a proof
pi.
Verifyck,pk(x, (t1, c1), . . . , (tn, cn), pi): Given a commitment key ck, a public key pk, a statement x, a proof pi and
commitments (ti, ci) ∈ Cck returns 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
Definition 6 (Perfect correctness). The extended commit-and-prove system ECP is (perfectly) correct if for all
adversaries A
Pr
ck ← Gen(1k) ; (pk, sk, pipk)← CreatePK(ck); (x,w1, r1, . . . , wn, rn)← A(ck, pk, sk, pipk) ;ci ← Comck,sk(wi; ri) ;pi ← Proveck,sk(x,w1, r1, . . . , wn, rn) :
VerifyPKck(pk, pipk) ·Verifyck,pk(x, (t1, c1), . . . , (tn, cn), pi) = 1
 = 1,
where A outputs wi, ri such that wi = (ti,mi) ∈Mck, (ti, ri) ∈ Rck and (ck, x, w1, . . . , wn) ∈ RL.
Definition 7 (Perfect soundness). The extended commit-and-prove system ECP is (perfectly) sound if there exists
a deterministic (unbounded) opening algorithm Open such that for all adversaries A
Pr
[
ck ← Gen(1k) ; (pk, pipk, x, t1, c1, . . . , tn, cn, pi)← A(ck) ; mi ← Openck(ti, ci) :
VerifyPKck(pk, pipk) ·Verifyck,pk(x, t1, c1, . . . , tn, cn, pi) = 0 ∨ (ck, x, (t1,m1), . . . , (tn,mn)) ∈ RL
]
= 1.
Perfect F -knowledge is defined exactly as for commit-and-prove schemes. This means that we will be using a
global extraction key asscoiated with ck for all commitments regardless of which public keys are used to generate
the commitments.
Definition 8 (Composable zero-knowledge). The extended commit-and-prove system ECP is (computationally)
composable zero-knowledge if there exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithms SimGen,SimCreatePK, SimCom,
SimProve such that for all non-uniform polynomial time stateful interactive adversaries A
Pr
[
ck ← Gen(1k) : A(ck) = 1
]
≈ Pr
[
(ck, tk)← SimGen(1k) : A(ck) = 1
]
and
Pr
[
(ck, tk)← SimGen(1k); (pk, sk, pipk)← CreatePK(ck) : A(ck, tk, pk, pipk) = 1
]
≈ Pr [ (ck, tk)← SimGen(1k); (pk, sk, pipk)← SimCreatePK(tk) : A(ck, tk, pk, pipk) = 1 ] ,
and
Pr
[
(ck, tk)← SimGen(1k); (pk, sk, pipk)← SimCreatePK(tk);
(x, i1, . . . , in)← AComck,sk(·)(ck, tk, pk, sk, pipk);pi ← Proveck,sk(x,wi1 , ri1 , . . . , win , rin) : A(pi) = 1
]
≈ Pr
[
(ck, tk)← SimGen(1k); (pk, sk, pipk)← SimCreatePK(tk);
(x, i1, . . . , in)← ASimComck,sk(·)(ck, tk, pk, sk, pipk);pi ← SimProveck,sk(x, ti1 , si1 , . . . , tin , sin) : A(pi) = 1
]
,
where
– Comck,sk(·) on wi = (ti,mi) ∈ Mck picks uniformly random ri such that (ti, ri) ∈ Rck and returns ci =
Comck,sk(wi; ri)
– SimComck,sk(·) on wi = (ti,mi) ∈ Mck runs (ci, si) ← SimComck,sk(ti) and returns ci, where si is some
auxiliary information used to construct simulated proofs.
– A picks (x, i1, . . . , in) such that (ck, x, wi1 , . . . , win) ∈ RL
9.2 Creating the public key
Like commitment keys, public keys can be created in two ways: they can either be perfectly binding or perfectly
hiding. These two types of keys are computationally indistinguishable if the SXDH assumption holds. As we already
argued, we will require the prover to create her public key in a perfectly binding way. However, the zero-knowledge
simulator will create a perfectly hiding public key and simulate the NIZK proof for well-formedness.
ProverGen(ck)
ρP ← Zp σP ← Zp
vˆP ← vˆ vˇP ← vˇ
wˆP ← ρP vˆP wˇP ← σP vˇP
uˆP ← wˆP + (0ˆ, gˆ)> uˇP ← wˇP + (0ˇ, hˇ)
pk ← (uˆP , vˆP , wˆP , uˇP , vˇP , wˇP )
sk ← (pk, ρP , σP )
Return (pk, sk)
SimProverGen(ck)
ρP ← Zp σP ← Zp
vˆP ← vˆ vˇP ← vˇ
wˆP ← ρP vˆP − (0ˆ, gˆ)> wˇP ← σP vˇP − (0ˇ, hˇ)
uˆP ← wˆP + (0ˆ, gˆ)> uˇP ← wˇP + (0ˇ, hˇ)
pk ← (uˆP , vˆP , wˆP , uˇP , vˇP , wˇP )
sk ← (pk, ρP , σP )
Return (pk, sk)
Fig. 11: Public key generator algorithms
As shown in Fig. 11, the public key is created in a similar way to how the commitment key is created. The
main difference is that the bilinear group (p, Gˆ, Hˇ,T, e, gˆ, hˇ) is already fixed, and that we allow the prover to reuse
the elements vˆ, vˇ. This both reduces the size of the public key and also ensures that the prover’s commitments are
extractable even when using her own key.
Once the prover has created her pair of public key and secret key, she has to compute an NIZK proof to show that
her pk is perfectly binding. A valid public key is defined by the existence of some ρP , σP such that wˆP = ρP vˆ and
wˇP = σP vˇ, which can be written as two equations of type MConstGˆ involving public elements in Gˆ and a secret ρP
committed in Hˇ, and two equations of type MConstHˇ involving public elements in Hˇ and a secret σP committed in
Gˆ. These are simple statements that each have a proof consisting of a single group element. In Fig. 12 we give the
exact NIZK proofs that have to be computed. The total cost of communicating the public key, which is determined
by wˆP , wˇP , the two commitments to ρP and σP and the four NIZK proofs is 12 group elements. Since we are using
a commit-and-prove scheme we can consider this as a one-off cost for each verifier engaging with the prover after
which the public key may be used for many commitments and proofs.
9.3 Proving the well-formedness of a prover-chosen CRS
As explained in Sec. 9.2, once the prover has chosen its own CRS a proof of well-formedness has to be given in order
to guarantee soundness. This is, the prover has to show that the values vˆP , wˆP , vˇP , wˇP satisfying
wˆP − vˆPρP = 0ˆ and wˇP − σP vˇP = 0ˇ,
for some secret values ρP , σP . To prove that these relations are satisfied, the prover can use Groth-Sahai proofs. In
Fig. 12 we detail what proofs need to be done by the prover to prove the well-formedness of her pk, writing J ij for
the 2 × 2 matrix such that all its elements are 0 except the element in row i and column j, which takes the value 1.
Note that these are ordinary Groth-Sahai proofs, which can be verified using the commitment key ck.
ProvePublicKeyck(pk, sk)
Parse vˆP , wˆP , vˇP , wˇP as ((vˆP )1, (vˆP )2 = gˆ), ((wˆP )1, (wˆP )2), ((vˇP )1, (vˇP )2 = hˇ), ((wˇP )1, (wˇP )2))
Compute the commitments dˇρ ← ρP uˇP + rρvˇ; cˆσ ← uˆPσP + vˆrσ; where rρ, rσ ← Zp
Define the following variables and types:
rx1 , sx1 , rx2 , sx2 , ry1 , sy1 , sy2 ← 0; ry2 ← rρ
tx1 = (pubGˆ, (wˆP )1), x1 = (wˆP )1, tx2 = (pubGˆ, (vˆP )1), x2 = (vˆP )1
ty1 = unitHˇ, y1 = 1, ty2 = scaHˇ, y2 = ρP
pi1 ← Proveck(MConstGˆ, (J11 − J22), {(txi , xi, (rxi , sxi))}2i=1, {(tyj , yj , (ryj , syj ))}2j=1)
Redefine the following variables and types:
rx1 , sx1 , rx2 , sx2 , ry1 , sy1 , sy2 ← 0; ry2 ← rρ
tx1 = (pubGˆ, (wˆP )2), x1 = (wˆP )2, tx2 = baseGˆ, x2 = gˆ
ty1 = unitHˇ, y1 = 1, ty2 = scaHˇ, y2 = ρP
pi2 ← Proveck(MConstGˆ, (J11 − J22), {(txi , xi, (rxi , sxi))}2i=1, {(tyj , yj , (ryj , syj ))}2j=1)
Redefine the following variables and types:
rx1 , sx1 , sx2 , ry1 , sy1 , ry2 , sy2 ← 0; rx2 ← rσ
tx1 = unitGˆ, x1 = 1, tx2 = scaGˆ, x2 = σP
ty1 = (pubHˇ, (wˇP )1), y1 = (wˇP )1, ty2 = (pubHˇ, (vˇP )1), y2 = (vˇP )1
pi3 ← Proveck(MConstHˇ, (J11 − J22), {(txi , xi, (rxi , sxi))}2i=1, {(tyj , yj , (ryj , syj ))}2j=1)
Redefine the following variables and types:
rx1 , sx1 , sx2 , ry1 , sy1 , ry2 , sy2 ← 0; rx2 ← rσ
tx1 = unitGˆ, x1 = 1, tx2 = scaGˆ, x2 = σP
ty1 = (pubHˇ, (wˇP )2), y1 = (wˇP )2, ty2 = baseHˇ, y2 = hˇ
pi4 ← Proveck(MConstHˇ, (J11 − J22), {(txi , xi, (rxi , sxi))}2i=1, {(tyj , yj , (ryj , syj ))}2j=1)
Return pipk = (cˆρ, dˇσ, pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4)
Fig. 12: Algorithm to prove well-formedness of the public key
9.4 Computing commitments and NIZK proofs
Once the prover has created her public key pk and has proven its well-formedness, she can make commitments and
prove statements using pk instead of ck. The commitments and proofs are created and verified in exactly the same
way as described in Fig. 3 and Fig. 8, but the number of scalar multiplications needed to compute commitments and
NIZK proofs can be reduced using her knowledge of the discrete logarithms in sk. We have for instance
cˆ = e>xˆ+ vˆr + wˆP s = e>xˆ+ vˆ(r + ρP s),
so the prover can compute a commitment with 2 scalar multiplications instead of 4 scalar multiplications.
As shown in Fig. 13, by using the secret key sk the prover can reduce the number of scalar multiplications by
50% for commitments to group elements and commitments to elements in Zp. Computing NIZK proofs is more
complicated and there are many operations that cannot be avoided by using the secret key sk. However, in some
cases the improvement is very noticeable as in the case of quadratic equations (T = QE) where the number of scalar
multiplications is reduced by 50%6. Furthermore, in most applications found in the literature there are only a few
variables in the equations, which makes our improvements more significant.
GS commitments This work
t Gˆ Hˇ Gˆ Hˇ
comGˆ 4 0 2 0
comHˇ 0 4 0 2
encGˆ Undefined 2 0
encHˇ Undefined 0 2
scaGˆ 4 0 2 0
scaHˇ 0 4 0 2
GS proofs This work
T Gˆ Hˇ Gˆ Hˇ
PPE 4|xˆ|+ 8 2|yˇ|+ 8 4|xˆ|+ 4 2|yˇ|+ 4
PEncGˆ Undefined 4|xˆ|+ 4 |yˇ|+ 2
PConstGˆ 2|xˆ| 0 2|xˆ| 0
PEncHˇ Undefined 2|xˆ|+ 2 2|yˇ|+ 4
PConstHˇ 0 2|yˇ| 0 2|yˇ|
MEGˆ |xˆ|+ 4 8 |xˆ|+ 2 4
MEncGˆ Undefined |xˆ|+ 2 2
MConstGˆ |xˆ| 0 |xˆ| 0
MLinGˆ 0 0 0 0
MEHˇ 8 |yˇ|+ 4 4 |yˇ|+ 2
MEncHˇ Undefined 2 |yˇ|+ 2
MConstHˇ 0 |yˇ| 0 |yˇ|
MLinHˇ 0 0 0 0
QE 4 4 2 2
QConstGˆ 0 0 0 0
QConstHˇ 0 0 0 0
Fig. 13: Scalar multiplications needed for computing commitments and NIZK proofs
9.5 Security proofs for the prover-chosen CRS commit-and-prove scheme
Lemma 5. The prover-chosen CRS commit-and-prove scheme has perfect correctness.
Lemma 6. The prover-chosen CRS commit-and-prove scheme has perfect soundness and perfect F -knowledge.
Perfect correctness, perfect soundness and perfect F -knowledge can be proven in a similar way to how they are
proven for our commit-and-prove scheme.
Lemma 7. The prover-chosen CRS commit-and-prove scheme is composable zero-knowledge if the SXDH assump-
tion holds relative to G.
Proof. (Sketch) The zero-knowledge simulator is quite straightforward given a zero-knowledge simulator for our
commit-and-prove scheme. First, the simulator will create the public key using the algorithm SimProverGen given
in Fig. 11. Then, instead of making NIZK proofs to show that the generated public key is binding, it will simulate
these proofs using the trapdoor key tk associated to ck. After simulating the well-formedness of pk, the simulator is
able simulate any proof by using the secret key sk.
It should be noted that the simulator is simulating an NIZK proof for a false statement as the public key generated
is no longer perfectly binding. In principle, the definition of zero-knowledge only guarantees that simulated proofs
are indistinguishable from honestly generated proofs as long as the statement is true. However, in our case the public
key and the simulated proof of well-formedness are computationally indistinguishable from a binding public key
generated with the algorithm ProverGen and an honestly generated well-formedness proof.
To see that, consider the following hybrid proof: the first game corresponds to the setting where the public key
is generated using ProverGen and the well-formedness proof is not simulated. The second game corresponds to
the same setting as the first game, but the well-formedness proof is simulated. Both games are computationally
indistinguishable due to the zero-knowledge property of Groth-Sahai proofs. In the third game, the public key is
generated using SimProverGen and the well-formedness proof is simulated. The second game and the third game
are computationally indistinguishable because the two types of public key are indistinguishable under the SXDH
assumption. uunionsq
6 We assume that operations in Hˇ are more computationally expensive than operations in Gˆ, as usually Gˆ is an elliptic curve over a prime
order field and Hˇ is the same elliptic curve over an extension field [GPS08]. Therefore, we have tried to reduce the numbers of operations
in Hˇ as much as possible. In addition, we have for simplicity assumed that the commitments that appear in the NIZK proof have as many
randomization factors as possible conditioned to the equation type T .
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